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Is There a Gap in Economic Culture





Theprocessof enlargementisin its ﬁnalstage,the sha v emor e
or less adapted to the western standards, which is not yet suﬃcient for
successful completion of the transition process successfully. We have
learned from the failed communism that the imported norms, institu-
tions and practices can cause entropy, unless they reﬂect the prevailing
cultural orientation in the society. People should believe that what they
are presented as right (norms) is also good (values). For this reason
the system of norms and values should be developed simultaneously.
The research results show that the symptoms of economic cultures are
less evident in the st h a ni nt h es e l e c t e d countries, thus the
democratic socialization (stimulated from outside) is the key issue. For
this reason the s should be included in the network of the Euro-
Atlantic integrations as soon as possible in order to ensure the demo-
cratic stability and economic eﬃciency of Europe.
Introduction
The process of  enlargement has reached its ﬁnal stage. The most ad-
vancedaccessioncountrieshaveclosedalmosteverynegotiationchapter.¹
In the process of transition the post-communist s² are becoming
more similar to the democratic societies³ and to the modern economic
systems from the structural and cultural⁴ point of view.
Structural adaptation requires the adoption of basic institutional, ju-
ridical and behavioural standards in force in the developed western so-
cieties. This process depends on the socio-economic resources, human
Dr Milan Zver is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Economics
and Business, University of Maribor, Slovenia.
Tjaša Živko, c, is Researcher at the Faculty of Economics
and Business, University of Maribor, Slovenia.
Dr Vito Bobek is Associated Professor at the Faculty of Economics
and Business, University of Maribor, Slovenia.
Managing Global Transitions  (): – Milan Zver, Tjaša Živko, and Vito Bobek
capital, skills, willingness and the interest of the social elites for imple-
menting structural reforms. These resources diﬀer from case to case;
some transition states are more successful than others.
While normative and behavioural patterns, as also the organisation
and institutional structure, can be ‘standardised’ relatively quickly in
favourable conditions, the problem is more complex at the level of the
core of culture, i.e. the value systems.
The process of structural and cultural synchronisation should not be
understood as a general cultural standardisation in the sense of uniﬁca-
tion and assimilation of diﬀerent cultures, or as a one-way adoption of
certain cultural patterns of Western Europe. However, the rich cultural
plurality of Europe should be provided with a core module of mutual
democratic and modern political and economic values, which would en-
sure the political and economic stability of the European Union in the
long run. Such a core of values was already created in Western Europe
after World War .
The purpose of our analysis is to ﬁnd out whether there are signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerences in the economic cultures of the s in comparison to
selected  countries. These will be compared on the basis of selected
variables, which will mark the cultural economic value orientations.⁵
Premises and Hypothesis
The speciﬁc cultural traits of the states are conditioned by the rate of the
general social development, the concrete historical experience, the reli-
gious orientation, the persistence of traditionalism, etc. The economic
culture is correlated with values and principles of the modern market
economy. We presume that:
Hypothesis : The selected European countries have developed a high
level of economic culture.
Hypothesis : In s the symptoms of economic culture are less de-
veloped than in selected countries.
Hypothesis : The s, which are more successful in the structural
adaptation to the western European standards, show similar pat-
terns in the phenomenon of the economic culture.
Research Model
The theoretical concept of the political culture is resumed after Almond
and Verba,⁶ the concept of economic culture after P. L. Berger.⁷ The no-
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tion of economic culture, inspired by Almond’s notion of political cul-
ture, was developed by Peter L. Berger, director of the Institute for the
Study of Economic Culture ()⁸ at Boston University, in the mid ’s.
The notion of economic culture after Berger cannot be conﬁned to the
frame of economic science, but can be investigated as a ‘global’, non-
economic phenomenon (, –). In conceiving the empirical model
Hofstede,⁹ Trompenaars¹⁰ and Inglehart’s¹¹ approaches to modern em-
pirical researches were used, which consider values to play the central
role in determining cultural orientations.
Professor Inglehart’s ongoing research focuses on cultural change and
its consequences. To explore this, he is coordinating a worldwide survey
of mass values and attitudes, the World Values survey. This database re-
vealsastonishingly stronglinkagesbetweenthevalues andbeliefsof mass
publics and the presence or absence of democratic institutions, support-
ing the thesis that political culture plays a crucial role in the emergence
and survival of democracy. The ﬁndings indicate that the evolution of
industrial society tends to make democratic political institutions more
likely, partly because the publics of these societies are becoming increas-
ingly likely to want democratic institutions, and increasingly adept at
gettingthem. This transformation doesnotcomeeasily orautomatically.
Determined elites, in control of the army and police, can resist pressures
for democratisation. But as they mature, industrial societies develop in-
creasingly specialized and educated labour forces, which become rela-
tively adept at exerting political pressure. Moreover, the emergence of
economically advanced welfare states leads to gradual value changes in
which mass publics give increasingly high priority to autonomy and self-
expression in a sphere of life, including politics. As these things happen,
it becomes increasingly diﬃcult and costly to repress demands for polit-
ical liberalization. These cultural changes are also transforming people’s
motivation to work, sexual and religious norms, and a number of other
central society and political orientations. In order to investigate these
changes, Professor Inglehart is analysing data from the three waves of
the World Values survey (carried out in ,  and  in  coun-
triescontainingover%oftheworld’spopulation¹²),andthe–
Euro-Barometer surveys.
Culture¹³ in a narrower, operational sense, can therefore be deﬁned as
thesystem ofvalues,whichorientate people’s behaviourandapproachto
the environment. In the empirical researches particular attention is paid
to the analysis of the values which constitute the core of a culture.
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The economic culture, which is deﬁned as a combination of economic
value beliefs, which orientate the economic behavior, can also be mea-
sured by the value indexes of the following variables:
•  – the ‘economic democratic syndrome’, which measures the
share of agreement with the statement that ‘democracy has a bad
inﬂuence on the economy’.¹⁴
• –the‘statistsyndrome’ measures theshareofthosewhobelieve
that‘thestateshouldownindustryandbusiness’,i.e.theoppositeof
thebeliefthat‘industryandbusinessshouldbeprivateownership’.¹⁵
•  – the ‘Martin Krpan’s¹⁶ syndrome’ measures the share of those
who think that ‘taking the opportunity of tax evasion can always be
justiﬁed’, i.e. the opposite of believing that ‘taking the opportunity
of tax evasion can never be justiﬁed’.¹⁷
• – the ‘rivals syndrome’ measures the share of those who believe
that ‘competition is harmful and it brings out the worst in peo-
ple’, i.e. the opposite belief to ‘competition is good and it stimulates
people to work hard and develop new ideas’.¹⁸
• – the ‘paternalistic syndrome’ measures the share of those who
believe that ‘the government should take more responsibility to en-
sure that everyone is provided for’, i.e. the opposite belief to ‘people
should take more responsibility to provide for themselves’.¹⁹
The symptoms of the economic culture are variables, by which simi-
larities and diﬀerences in national cultural orientations will be measured
(units being the single states). The following units (states) have been in-
cluded in the research: Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Esto-
nia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary,
Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovenia, i.e. a combination of selected West-
ern states with more or less stable democracies and successful market
economies (three members) and the s(  transition economies
and at the same time potential accession countries).
All deductions are based on the presumption that the higher the in-
dexes, the more diﬃcult the compatibility with the standards of democ-
racy and market economy in Western democracies.
The Creation of theDatabaseandthe Results
We used the database from the  , which is kept in the Archives
of Sociologic Data of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of
Ljubljana.TheEuropeanValuesSurveyincludesEuropeancountries,²⁰
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Table : Syndromes of economic culture (indexes)
State     
Great Britain . . . . .
The Netherlands . . . . .
Germany . . . . .
Estonia . . . . .
Latvia . . . . .
Lithuania . . . . .
Poland . . . . .
The Czech Republic . . . . .
Slovakia . . . . .
Hungary . . . . .
Romania . . . . .
Bulgaria . . . . .
Slovenia . . . . .
and interviews have been made on samples of approximately , peo-
ple in each country (all together , interviews). The  questions
posed to the interviewees were about relationship to the environment,
personal happiness, social distance, work and employment, fair pay, dis-
crimination at the workplace, religion, democracy, and many more. As
far as , ,  and syndromes are concerned, the interviewees
in   could answer with grades  to . When answering the ques-
tionabout ,theinterviewees hadtochoosetheansweronafour-level
scale. The calculations of indexes for the observed states were explained
in the previous chapter and are given in Table .W eh a v ea l s op e r f o r m e d
aclusteranalysisfromallvariables,whichisrepresentedasadendrogram
in Figure  (discussed in conclusion).
Values of  are highest in Romania, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia and
Slovakia, which means that these countries recognize a weak connection
between democracy and economy, while in Great Britain, Germany and
theNetherlandswecanobservetheoppositeopinion.Greaterdiﬀerences
between countries can be seen in  values. The meaning of the en-
trepreneur’s initiative is more important in Great Britain, Germany and
– perhaps surprisingly – in Lithuania, while in Latvia, Slovakia, Poland
and Hungary they believe, that the state should have more control over
the s. Tax evasion is understood in Europe as something negative, it
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Figure : Dendrogram using Ward Method
is not an economic value (diﬀerences in values are small). The com-
petition is also not a deﬁning factor for diﬀerentiation of economic cul-
ture in the European countries (the diﬀerentials in  values are small
and atypical). The values are lowest in the western European coun-
tries (Great Britain, Germany and the Netherlands). In these countries
dominates the ethics of individual responsibility. By contrast, there is a
prevailing belief in the transition economies that the state is responsible,
that everyone is provided for. This syndrome is most present in the value
orientation of Latvians, Slovaks, Slovenes and Estonians.
Conclusions
The transformation process from a centrally planned economy to a mar-
ket one is a very complex issue in which normative and behavioural
patterns, as also the organisation and institutional structure, can be
‘standardised’ relatively quickly in favourable conditions. The problem
is more complex at the level of the core of culture, i.e. the value systems.
If a critical mass of the appropriate political-democratic and modern
economic values is not reached, this will present additional obstacles to
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the process of transition in the long run. This problem has been often
neglected both in theory, as well as in practice.
The theoretical concept of the political culture has been resumed after
Almond and Verba, the concept of economic culture after P. L. Berger.
Thedatabasefromthe -,whichiskeptintheArchivesofSociologic
Data at the University of Ljubljana has been used. Various variables of
the economic culture had been taken into account, by which similarities
and diﬀerences in national cultural orientations have been measured in
 countries, representing a combination of selected Western states with
more or less stable democracies and successful market economies (three
 members) and the s(  transition economies and at the same
time potential accession countries).
In the dendrogram the two branches join relatively late, which means
that diﬀerences between the  countries and s are signiﬁcant.
Two basic groups of countries were formed, which diﬀer by the pres-
ence of the symptoms of economic culture.²¹ Great Britain, Germany
and the Netherlands represent the ﬁrst, and the second is formed out
of s. This proves the ﬁrst (higher degree of economic culture in se-
lected countries)andthesecondhypothesis(theexistenceofthebasic
gap economic culture in Europe). The diﬀerences among the other sub-
groups in the s, show too little evidence to allow any valid conclu-
sion, a part from the fact that we can detect similarities among the sub-
group Latvia–Slovakia–Poland–Hungary, followed by a subgroup Czech
Republic–Bulgaria–Romania–Lithuania.²²
How can the s overcome the gap between the pre-modern and
modern economic values among national cultures in Europe? Experi-
ence shows that the transition states do not have a suﬃcient amount of
inner energy for a democratic cultivation, while the elites in power often
show little interest in it. The help needed can be achieved with an ac-
celerated integration of s into Euro-Atlantic integration, which will
have a benign inﬂuence on a faster implementation of democratic polit-
ical and economic values, thus ﬁrmly guaranteeing a stable, democratic
and peaceful Europe, able to express itself as a speciﬁc cultural entity in
the world in the political-cultural and economic sense.
Notes
. This paper has been written a few months before the enlargement of
the  took place.
. Central and Eastern European Countries.
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. Thetransitionprocessin shasbeenquickerduetodesiredmem-
bership of the .
. No culture is superior or inferior to another. We are accepting In-
glehart’s concept of modernization, which means that cultural values
change from pre-modern (distinctive for transition countries), mod-
e r nt op o s t - m o d e r n .T h e s ec h a n g e sa r en e v e rl i n e a r .
. (EuropeanValues Survey) providesan opportunityto learn about
the attitudes of citizens of diﬀerent nations towards selected issues.
In the research model of culture we selected issues we believed to be
accepted in the economic culture of the  as politically democratic
and modern from the socio-economic point of view. The symptoms
ofeconomicculturearethereforeexpressedinthedegreeoftheaccep-
tance of democracy, acceptance of market economy, of free initiative,
and no justiﬁcation of tax evasion and self-responsibility.
. The ﬁrst to base the term of political culture was Gabriel A. Almond
(). In the ’sheandSidney Verbaempiricallybased thenotion of
political culture onacomparative internationalopinionpoll(Almond
and Verba ). They conﬁrmed a close relation between democratic
political culture and democratic political systems.
. Professor Berger previously taught at the New School for Social Re-
search, at Rutgers University, and at Boston College. We are taking the
concept of economic culture from his book The capitalist revolution:
Fifty prepositions about prosperity, equality and liberty (Berger ).
.  was founded at Boston University in . Its purpose was to do
research on the relations between socio-economicchangeand culture,
the latter term understood in its usual social-scientiﬁc sense – that is,
as the belief, values and lifestyles of diﬀerent human groups. Essen-
tially, the idea of establishing the  was very simple: Economists
do not like to deal with culture, because it does not easily lend itself
to their methods; when they do deal with it, they do so by apply-
ing concepts that tend to distort it. Those in the human sciences
who do deal with culture, on the other hand, shy away from the
economic issues, because economics appears to be a forbiddingly
diﬃcult discipline. Consequently, there is a certain lacuna when it
comes to our understanding of this particular relationship. Yet it
is an important one. Thus, to take a very important example, it
has become amply clear that the successful establishment of a mar-
ket economy has certain cultural perquisites, without which even
the most sophisticated economic strategies are likely to falter (see
http://www.bu.edu/cura/about/introduction.html).
. According to Hofstede culture is the ‘software of mind’, which orients
human behavior, is acquired by socialization, and has the following
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essential qualities: it is shared, collective and allows group distinction
(, ).
. Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, who created a highly useful
model of intercultural researches, distinguish three levels of cultural
manifestation: the highest is related to the national scale, the mid-
dle one refers to the sense for corporation and organization, and the
lowest one to professional culture ().
. For more than twenty years Ronald Inglehart has been studying cul-
tural, economic and political changes in  states worlwide, which
have been developing in the sense of modernism or postmodernism
(). He extendedthe project to otherparts oftheworld().
In exchange for providing the data from interviews with a repre-
sentative national sample of at least , people in their own so-
ciety, each participating group gains immediate access to the data
from all of other participating societies. Thus, they are able to com-
pare the basic values and beliefs of the people of their own society
with those of more than  other societies. In addition, they are
invited to international meetings at which they can compare ﬁnd-
ings and interpretations with other members of the  network.
This deals with interdependence of cultural, economic and politi-
cal subsystems, which develop together and in a coherent way (see
http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/ringlehart/research.html)
. See http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/index.html.
. In the broadestsociological senseculture can be understoodas a com-
plex of material, institutional and spiritual organisms (Giddens ,
).
. The possible answers were ‘agree strongly’, ‘agree’, ‘neither agree nor
disagree’, and ‘disagree’ that the democracy has a bad inﬂuence on the
economy; to be able to compare  index to the other ones, we had
to ﬁnda way to make themcompatible.The percentagesof the answer
‘agree strongly’ were multiplied by ,‘ a g r e e ’b y,‘ a g r e en o rd i s a g r e e ’
by  and ‘disagree’ by . The sum of these was divided by ,i no r d e r
to get the average value.
. Thetwoextremeswere:–‘privateownershipofbusinessandindustry
should be increased’, and  – ‘government ownershipof business and
industry should be increased’; the percentage of the chosen answer
was multiplied by the grade of the choice, and their sum was divided
by ,i no r d e rt og e ta na v e r a g ev a l u e .
. The terms refer to a popular Slovene story (novel) ﬁgure who smug-
gled English salt around the Austrian Empire. In nowadays terms, he
evaded taxes.
. The same procedure as .
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. The same procedure as .
. The same procedure as .
.F r a n c e , ,Germany,Austria,Italy,Spain,Portugal,Netherlands,Bel-
gium, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, Northern Ireland, Ireland, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Roma-
nia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Russia, Malta, Luxembourg, Slovenia,
Belarus.
. We should bear in mind the limits of the results achieved. If a larger
number of states and variables were included, economic cultural dis-
tribution of  types would be much more valid. So let us stress once
more, that this research aimed in the ﬁrst place at the demonstration
of a research model.
. The exceptions are Estonia and Slovenia, which together with Latvia–
Slovakia–Poland–Hungary form the ﬁrst sub-cluster of the s.
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